This paper looks at the phenomenon of "defensive regulatory competition" in European corporate law following Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art. In order to retain control over the corporate governing private limited entities operating within their territories and to prevent the proliferation of "foreign limited" formations, Member States have modified some of the features of their laws that company founders considers most unattractive, such as minimum capital and time-consuming incorporation procedures. The first part of the paper analyzes the market for the law governing privately held firms, drawing from the debate in the United States. The US and Europe differ in that regulatory competition, as far as substantive law is concerned, focuses mainly on ex post mechanisms such as directors' duties and veil piercing. By contrast, European competition seems to be driven by ex ante issues relating to firm formation, such as minimum capital. The second part of the paper draws from an ongoing empirical research project that attempts to explore the effects of regulatory competition and uses reforms in Germany and Belgium as examples. Regression analysis suggests that at least the German 2008 reform had a minor effect on the number of UK private limited companies being set up to do business in Germany.
Inspire Art. 5 I suggest that in Europe, the absence of a market for corporate law has meant that there were initially relatively low-hanging fruit to pick for regulatory competition, whereas the relatively limited US debate focuses on more subtle doctrinal issues (that likely impose smaller costs on founders). In its empirical part, this article draws from an empirical analysis developed in a companion paper. 6 Using the examples of reforms in Germany and Belgium (for which Austrian and Dutch firm formations serve as control groups), I suggest that the reforms had a small but discernable impact at least in Germany. However, one could argue that the overall effects of Continental European firm formations in the UK were small, which raises questions about the justification of defensive regulatory competition.
Section 2 briefly surveys the debate about regulatory competition in the United States and compares it to the European debate. It also seeks to circumscribe the concept of "defensive regulatory competition," which has been a major, if sometimes underappreciated element of the European development, and contrasts it with "insolvencification," the other response by some Member States. Section 3 seeks to tackle defensive regulatory competition empirically and seeks to quantify the extent of its effects. Section 4 summarizes and concludes.
Privately held firms and regulatory competition 2.1. Privately held firms in the US
The United States is the jurisdiction of reference for any study looking at regulatory competition in corporate law. The bulk of the literature there, however, deals with publicly traded firms, in part because these are the focus of academic interest in general, and because of the availability of data. 7 By contrast, in Europe the practical impact of the free choice of incorporation has been constrained mainly to privately held firms, particularly private limited companies.
Incorporation choices are made only on occasion, either in the form of an initial incorporation in a particular state, or in the form of a reincorporation to another state, which is usually implemented through a merger in the US. 8 For publicly traded corporations, where proxy disclosure requirements add considerable cost to a reincorporation, the capital market still sets some of the key incentives driving these choices. On the one hand, there are considerable information asymmetries between management (or, as the case may be, controlling shareholders) on the one hand, and dispersed investors on the other, which might lead to the conclusion that the market for corporate law will disfavor outside investors. On the other hand, market prices should in principle adjust to features of the chosen state corporate law that affect firm value, thus setting incentives to choose a value-maximizing corporate law.
It is not entirely clear whether US states actively compete for the incorporation of privately held business entities, or whether law-making activities in the field can be distinguished from the objective of creating a business-friendly environment. 9 There are reasons to believe that state legislatures are little suited to draft statutes to compete for close corporations, and that they may have weak incentives to do so. 10 While we cannot be sure about the existence of regulatory competition, there is clearly regulatory arbitrage, meaning that at least some founders actively seek out the most suitable law. Factors driving incorporation choices in closely-held business entities (both corporations and LLCs) are likely very different (even if Delaware also dominates the market for firms that are formed outside of the state of their principal place of business 11 ). Courts in some US states have -at least at one time -had the tendency to apply heightened fiduciary duties in such firms, in particular to protect minority shareholders stuck with an investment for which there is no market. 12 The general trend in business law has been toward more contractual freedom since the 1990s.
LLCs in particular are often described as creatures of contract, 13 which at least rhetorically undercuts the view that traditional common law fiduciary duties should apply. 14 LLC law, for example in Delaware, today sometimes allows a complete opt out of fiduciary duties, thus leaving only a contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing. 15 The policy argument here is that (minority) members of closely-held entities are typically quite well informed, and are thus in a good position to strike bargains ex ante that best serve their own interests. 16 Larry Ribstein, a leading proponent of the contractarian view, thus argued that fiduciary duties should apply only where conflicts of interest between managers and outsiders resemble the situation in publicly traded corporations. 17 Fiduciary duties may also become, even if initially beneficial, incrementally so burdensome that there are incentives for parties to opt out. 18 Frankel 1995 Frankel , p 1266 (criticizing the erosion of fiduciary duties through empty consent). 15 DLLCA § 18-1101(e). 16 E.g. Romano 1992, p 412-3; Gelter 2005, p 270. 17 Ribstein 2005, p 249. 18 Gelter and Helleringer 2018, p 118. shareholders changes the distribution between the majority and minority shareholders. Thus, closely held firms would likely tend to incorporate in jurisdictions that favor controlling shareholders. 19 Member interests are typically closely aligned against the interests of creditors in privately held firms. Regardless of the debate whether and which creditors actually need legal protection, 20 legislation intended to protect creditors seems to play hardly any role in the US regulatory competition debate. States are divided between those (like Delaware and New York 21 ) that still use a legal capital system, and those -following the Model Business Corporation Act 22 that do not.
Legal capital rules in the US are easy to work around, and no state requires a minimum capital. 23 Consequently, another creditor protection doctrine seems to matter in the market for incorporations, namely the extent to which state courts are inclined to pierce the corporate (or LLC) veil and hold shareholders liable to creditors.
Only a handful of studies have attempted to gauge the key factors driving incorporation choices of closely held firms empirically. First, some studies emphasize substantive features of the law. Dammann and Schündeln's findings indicate that both corporations and LLCs with their principal place of business in states where veil piercing is seen to be likely are more likely to register in another state. 24 They suggest that closely held corporations tend to avoid states with mechanisms 19 Dammann and Schündeln 2011, p 81. 20 Armour 2006, p 17-21; Adler and Kahan 2013, p 1779-81. 21 Dammann and Schündeln 2011, pp 95-96; Dammann and Schündeln 2012, pp 755-756. to protect minority shareholders. 25 By contrast, LLCs are founded out of state to avoid a minority oppression statute. 26 Overall, Dammann and Schündeln's analysis supports the argument that substantive law creating liability risk matters, even if the direction of this effect is not entirely consistent. At least at a time, Nevada's efforts in the incorporation market were targeted at a certain segment best described as "Wild West" corporations, touting the difficulty of piercing the corporate veil, the privacy guaranteed by bearer shares, and its reticence in sharing information with the IRS. 27 Since then, Nevada has also targeted the market for publicly traded corporations and provided them with the option of liability protection for directors and managers, as well as ability to defend against hostile takeovers. 28
Second, the quality of the legal system overall, and the quality of the courts seems to militate in favor of Delaware. Kobayashi and Ribstein's empirical results suggest that the quality of the courts according to various indices, and the adoption of a "series LLC" provision 29 -as a proxy for innovativeness -draw the registration of LLCs with their principal place of business in another state. 30 This finding is consistent with the fact that LLC law in the US generally provides for a great deal of flexibility and that the parties will generally be able to tailor any state's law to their needs (as far as the relationship between the members is concerned). 31 In any event, one can easily 25 Dammann and Schündeln 2011, pp 95-96. 26 Dammann and Schündeln 2012, pp 757. 27 Kahan and Kamar 2002, p 717 . On the rise of Nevada as a "liability-free" jurisdiction, see also Barzuza 2012. 28 Many Nevada firms appear to be shell companies without significant activities. Anderson 2018, p 674. On the rise of Nevada as a "liability-free" jurisdiction, see also Barzuza 2012; Zorzi 2017, p 257; Eldar 2019, pp 556-560. 29 A series LLC permits the creation of several "series" of assets within an LLC, which allows e.g. the compartmentalization of different types of real estate investment without the ability of creditors to go after the assets in another series. See, e.g. DLLCA § 18-218(c). 30 Kobayashi and Ribstein 2011, p 128 . See also Dammann and Schündeln 2011, pp 94-95 (finding that firms from states with a court system generally to be perceived as not particularly good are more likely to incorporate outside of the state). 31 Kobayashi and Ribstein 2011, pp 97, 111. argue that piercing the corporate or LLC veil can hardly be a strong factor in determining choice of state because states do not consistently apply the incorporation state's law to veil piercing. 32 Third, Delaware law serves as a "lingua franca" in the law of business associations in the US. One might think that small firms have less to gain from the network effects created by the large number of Delaware corporations (and LLCs). 33 However, since lawyers across the country are familiar with Delaware law, it enables them to provide investors with a set of rules that they can understand. Consistent with that, new out-of-state venture capital investors were found to be more likely to invest in firms with whose home state law they were already familiar. 34 Relatedly, a study of private securities offerings found that legally more sophisticated firms were more likely to choose Delaware. 35 Finally, a survey among business lawyers found that the Delaware judiciary and brand, as well as the knowledge of Delaware law mattered for the choice to set up an LLC there. 36
Competition for privately held firms in Europe
Before Centros, EU Member States were divided between those using the "incorporation theory" and those using the "real seat theory" in the private international law of companies. While the incorporation theory recognizes the legal existence of a business entity if it fulfills the formation requirements in the state where it was legally formed, the "real seat theory" requires that founders must follow the formation procedures of its principal place of business, i.e. the country 32 35 Anderson 2018, p 694. 36 Gevurtz 2012, p 105. of its "real seat." Without following such procedures a company might face drastic consequences, up to its non-recognition or treatment as a partnership.
The purpose of the real seat theory is not to protect the creditors (or shareholders) of any particular company, but rather the protection of a country's authority to determine the law of business entities operating within its territory. Creditors might in fact be harmed if a court found that a debtor company lacked legal capacity. 37 The consequences of the real seat theory compelled founders to select the law of the real seat jurisdiction, thus protecting it from competition. All of this changed with the seminal cases of Centros (1999 ), Überseering (2002 ), and Inspire Art (2003 , where the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), while not discussing the real seat theory as such, found its consequences to be incompatible with the freedom of establishment. In addition, Inspire Art invalidated a Dutch law that imposed certain liabilities on foreign companies with their real seat in the Netherlands.
Some of the early post-Centros literature explored whether this would transpose the US model of regulatory competition to Europe. The general tenor was that there would be considerable differences, in particular because of a lack of member state incentives to compete, and because of considerable hurdles for publicly traded firms to use regulatory arbitrage opportunities. 38 However, soon after Inspire Art, the focus of the debate became privately held firms, in particular because founders of new firms increasingly seemed to set up their business as private limited companies in the UK (specifically in England and Wales). Thus, unlike in the US, privately held firms 37 E.g. Hopt 2010, p 16; Gelter 2017, pp 310, 317. 38 On this debate, see, e.g. To the limited extent that we have a clear picture of the market for new formations of privately held firms in the US, we can identify two differences between the US and Europe. First, free choice of corporate law has been available in the United States for much longer than in the EU. Looking at the supply side, market forces may already have asserted their cleansing effects 39 Not only minimum capital, but formal steps related to capital raising, such as notarization requirements, bank confirmations and valuations of contributions in kind likely play a role. and purged company law of such requirements. Arguably, if neither US states other than Delaware 42 , nor European jurisdictions have incentives to attract the formation of closely held business from elsewhere 43 , then there appears to be no inherent reason why even costly rules with little apparent benefit should disappear. But legislatures may at times just have been motivated by the objective of facilitating business for their own constituents, of which a more streamlined corporate and LLC law would be a byproduct. 44 The fact that the LLC itself was introduced and spread across jurisdictions shows that income streams from franchise fees are not a necessary condition.
Second, looking toward the demand side of the market for corporate law, we can see that the cost-benefit calculus for founders is different. European regulatory arbitrage opportunities have much lower-hanging fruit within reach. Comparatively, marginal differences in directors' duties or piercing the corporate veil likely do not impose a great cost on founders. The probability that these doctrines will become relevant is small, and litigation lies many years in the future. By contrast, up-front founding procedures and financing constraints that hinder capital formation are a much more immediate burden for founders to reckon with. 45 Thus, in Europe, ex ante costs loom larger, and these will have to be incurred with certainty during the founding stage of the firm. In the US, where ex ante costs are very small in comparison, other factors may be more important. 42 Kahan and Kamar 2002 (suggesting that only Delaware competes in general); but see Kobayashi and Ribstein 2011, pp 98-99 (suggesting that states have incentives to compete for LLC formations). 43 Tröger 2005, pp 43-48. 44 Reyes and Vermeulen 2013, pp 461-473 (suggesting that pressure from competition-oriented interest groups such as lawyers will often result in an improvement of the law of business organizations). Lawyers benefit specifically from the attractiveness of the law on which they consult, but -like other interest groups -often also from a businessfriendly environment in general. 45 One might argue that minimum capital does not actually impose a cost because it is available to the firm. However, empirical evidence suggests that minimum capital requirements deter entrepreneurship because of financing constraints. Blanchflower and Oswald 1998, pp 42-46 The cost-benefit calculus is also impacted by the cost of learning about differences in the law in other jurisdictions in the first place. It is relatively low in the US, where lawyers across the country are often familiar with Delaware corporate and LLC law. In Europe, it often involves immersion in a different legal culture rooted in a different language. Informing oneself about it (even if the help of an agent) may only be worthwhile when large benefits can be made. Only differences in the law producing large gains will present themselves as viable arbitrage opportunities. Minimum capital will make the cut, but fiduciary duty and veil piercing may not. If anything, it appears that some founders during the wave of incorporations following Inspire Art underestimated the impact of aspects of English law they had not immediately considered. This is illustrated by the early experience of German founders with the UK private limited company. One likely explanation for the decline of popularity of "Centros firms" around 2006 is that many founders underestimated the cost of maintaining a UK firm, particularly financial accounting disclosure requirements, as well as the vigor with which they were enforced by the UK authorities. As Ringe suggests, this may have resulted in the striking of a considerable number of these firms from the register. 46 Compared to the relatively subtle substantive doctrinal differences in fiduciary duties and veil piercing that appear in the US debate, issues such as these should still be relatively easy to compare between countries.
Tax law might further help to explain differences in the market for initial firm formations between the US and Europe. While in the US corporate tax is largely federal and states generally only tax in-state profits, EU member states generally apply the real seat principle to corporate 46 Ringe 2013, pp 261-263. taxation. 47 At least in theory, this means that incorporation in another Member State should not affect taxation for a newly founded firm because the real seat state retains the authority to tax. 48 At the initial firm formation stage, European firms after Centros can combine the desired corporate law with the desired tax law in situations where profit can be transferred to a holding company or subsidiary with its real seat in a low-tax jurisdiction. 49 With corporate law likely being of small relevance for wholly-owned firms within a group, regulatory competition studies might pick up incorporations of this type in their data collection efforts.
Insolvencification and defensive regulatory competition
As we have seen, competition in the market for newly founded firms in Europe affects mainly firms' relationships with creditors. Member States professing their intention to protect creditors reacted with two legislative strategies, which have been described as "insolvencification" and "defensive regulatory competition." 50 Both concern mainly the Member State's attempts to preserve certain creditor protection mechanisms for companies operating in its territory. In both cases, the country in question attempts to retain control of the law applying to corporations operating mainly within its territory, but with very different effects.
Insolvencification constitutes the legislative, jurisprudential or doctrinal recharacterization of a corporate law mechanism as insolvency law. 51 Under the European Insolvency Regulation, the applicable insolvency law is determined not by a corporation's registered office, but by the 47 Kane and Rock 2008 , pp 1265 , 1271 53 Among other things, the law arguably "insolvencified" directors' liability for failing to file for insolvency, as well as the subordination of shareholder loans, by placing these doctrines in insolvency law, but also modifying some of their features. 54 The CJEU went a step further in its 2016 Kornhaas opinion, in which it effectively "insolvencified" the German directors' liability statute as it existed before MoMiG.
Applying a functional test, the court characterized it as insolvency law, even if at the time its legal basis was in corporate law (specifically § 64 GmbHG). 55 While insolvencification attempts to retain the existing law, defensive regulatory competition actually results in a modification of the law. 56 Lennarts 2017, pp 114-115, 117-118. 55 Simona Kornhaas v. Thomas Dithmar, Case C-594/14. But see Ringe 2017, p 273 (criticizing the court's reasoning as unpersuasive). 56 For the use of the term, e.g. Enriques and Gelter 2007, p 424; Enriques and Gelter 2007, p 600; Ringe 2013, p 243. 57 While outside of the purview of this article, the introduction of loyalty shares to discourage the transfer of publicly traded firms (seeking security from hostile takeover) to another Member State may also be characterized as defensive regulatory competition. See Pacces 2016, p 213. Spain created a new company type called Sociedad Limitada Nueva Empresa (SLNE), which was subject to certain limitations, but could be formed within 24 hours. 58 Other member states have made progress in this area as well. Even Austria allows a simplified firm formation procedure for single-member GmbHs from 2018 onwards. 59 With the enactment of the Commission's proposal on digital tools in company law 60 as a directive, differences between Member States will likely further decrease in favor of faster firm formation procedures.
Second, a number of member states have introduced special private company forms with smaller or no legal capital requirements. Here, we see quite a bit of variety. Germany's MoMiG provides one of the most well-known examples by creating a modified form of the GmbH called Unternehmergesellschaft (haftungsbeschränkt), which does not require a minimum capital, but which must retain all of its profits until the regular minimum capital is reached. 61 Another example is Belgium, which introduced the societé privée à responsabilité-starter, or SPRL-S in 2010. 62 The SPRL-S was subject to certain limitations, but was not subject to the ordinary minimum capital of € 18,500. The law initially provided that "starter" firms had to increase their capital to the minimum amount within five years from registration. 63 A 2014 reform removed this restriction, as well as a limitation to no more than 5 full-time employees. 64 Third, a number of Member States have considerably reduced or even eliminated minimum capital requirements for private limited companies. For example, a Dutch reform of 2012 reduced the minimum capital of the Besloten vennootschap to one cent. 65 Belgium's 2019 company law adopted an even more radical solution when it abandoned the legal capital system for the SARL/BV entirely. 66 Similar trends have prevailed in the formerly communist Member States that have or had a minimum capital. For example, the Czech Republic reduced its minimum capital to 1 Kč with the 2012 Companies Act. 67
Beyond these examples, we can identify a general trend toward the simplification of company formation procedures and a reduction, even elimination of capital requirements. Legislators' true (and likely diverse) motives for any particular reform are hard to gauge. In fact, in many cases the objective may not have been exclusively or partly of a defensive nature, but rather to improve the entrepreneurial environment more generally, without necessarily having regard to a flight of new firm formations to the UK, or to improve the country's ranking in the World Bank's "Doing Business" Report. 68 But as far as the "defensive" motive is concerned, one could say states could be legitimately interested in retaining control over the legal framework of business associations operating mainly within their territory. Other than in the US, whose constituent states share the same legal culture, Bartolacelli 2016, p. 705. of other Member States. Members, creditors and other constituencies interacting with a firm may have to incur considerable information efforts to deal with an entity governed by unfamiliar law. 69 Some of these may be able to adjust to these circumstances, but others may not, or may underestimate risks.
Leaving such an idealized vision of legislative motives aside, a more realistic explanation has to be rooted in an analysis of interest group shaping such ideals and consequently legislative developments. From a regulatory competition perspective, one would argue that if creditors actually benefit from capital requirements, they would push for their retention and thus against defensive regulatory competition measures. However, they could also recognize that an evasion of domestic corporate law by pseudo-foreign incorporations would be more harmful to them, and that they would benefit more if the overwhelming majority of firms were set up under domestic law, albeit with relaxed requirements. Given that the actual value of the prevailing creditor protection rules is today very much in doubt, however, one is tempted to suspect that the domestic legal profession may be the main interest group that might want a Member State to retain control over corporate laws within its territory. Lawyers and notaries (who often earn fees for registering companies or their branch offices 70 ) might be concerned about losing business of founders were to incorporate in another Member State. In a similar vein, Halbhuber provocatively suggested that time, whereas Braun et al (2013) use difference-in-difference regressions to explore the impact of legal reforms on the affected type of firm relative to other firms in the same country. It is not entirely clear how to quantify the Centros phenomenon based on this information.
Constructing time series to capture the Centros phenomenon
In theory, the director's and managers' place of residence seems preferable as the criterion, given that one would expect a privately held firm to incorporate in the jurisdiction where the key individuals are located. This is the approach taken by Becht et al (2008) , whose data end in 2006.
However, under Chapter 8, Part 10 of the Companies Act 2006, the publication of a directors' residential address is now optional, which is why residence data lead to undercounting.
Citizenship data are more comprehensive, but are vulnerable to trends in international migration. If the number of citizens of a country living in the UK has increased, we can expect more of these individuals to found private limited companies in the UK; measuring the number of these firms then necessarily overestimates the Centros phenomenon. Estimates about the number of migrants can be obtained from the United Nations, which provide estimates every 5 years. 86 Figure   3 shows the ratio of the estimated number of citizens of EU and EFTA countries on a logarithmic scale. If the numbers for 1995 and 2015 are the same, the country would be on the diagonal line.
There is only one country below the line, namely Ireland, where the number of migrants has presumably decreased. All other countries are above the line, but to a different extent. Countries where the number of migrants increased strongly, such as Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and the Baltic states are far above the line.
Figure 3: Relationship between number of migrants in 1995 and 2015
Differential migration rates make it hard to compare Centros-style firm formations between different countries, especially in the newer Member States. While one possibility is to adjust the raw data for the estimated number of firms formed by migrants from a given country, 87 the better way to capture only the Centros phenomenon is probably to include only firms using an incorporation agent with a shared registered office 88 , which individuals already living in the target country will likely not need to do.
Is defensive regulatory competition even necessary?
The empirical investigation allows us to assess whether defensive regulatory competition is necessary and legitimate from a policy perspective. If cross-border firm formations remain a fringe phenomenon even after Inspire Art, then it seems hard to make the argument that it is needed for the respective jurisdiction to retain control over the law primarily operating within its territory 87 Gerner-Beuerle et al 2018, p 18. 88 Ringe 2013, pp 247-253. Ringe uses the FAME database, which is restricted to UK data but is otherwise equivalent.
(even if policymakers likely had a different impression in the early years). Figure 4 shows the estimated ratio of "Centros" firms to overall firm formations (Panel C) for selected countries.
Figure 4: Ratio of UK-registered private limited companies to private and public limited company formations in the host country
Only in Germany did the ratio reach almost 15% in two years. Otherwise, only Denmark and Austria showed a share of more than 5% in a single year each. The overall conclusion might be that the impact of Centros and its follow-up cases on the national market of incorporation was only minor.
It is even more revealing to look at the number of German firms founded in those years that were still active at the time of the search (in fact, many will likely never have developed significant activity). The number of German firms in Panel C (the "agent" category) is shown in Figure 5 .
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3433142 Austrian GmbHs are considered "privileged" (gründungsprivilegiert) during the first ten years after formation. For this period, the firm's statutes must specify a "privileged" capital of at least € 10,000, of which at least € 5,000 must be contributed in cash prior to registration. 90 Ringe pointed out that the number of "German" and "Austrian" limited company incorporations in the 89 Braun et al 2013, p 409. 90 § § 6, 6a, 10, 10b GmbHG (Austria) . See, e.g. Bartolacelli 2017, pp 212-215. UK went down after 2006 concurrently in spite of the difference in the domestic legislation. He suggests that the reduction is more likely explained by actions in the UK that affected both countries equally. In particular, founders may not have been aware of hidden costs of incorporation, and the reduction of firm formations seems to coincide with the likely time when it became apparent that the Companies House would strike firms from the register if they did not show signs of activity, in particular by repeatedly failing to submit their balance sheet. 91
Germany has about 10 times the population and about 9 times the GDP of Austria. Before 2002, German firms are slightly underrepresented, with slightly more than 6 times as many German than Austrian firms. Subsequently, German firms are overrepresented, with about 25 times as many German than Austrian firms in 2004, and 21 times the number in 2006, when the numbers peak in both countries. The ratio between German and Austrian firms then declines to 17 in 2008, 10.5 in 2009 and slightly less than 9 in 2010. Nevertheless, the comparison between the two countries can serve as a useful test case because the two countries' corporate laws and legal systems are very similar. While the MoMiG law is not a natural experiment, the concern about Centrosstyle firm formations was considerable in both countries at the time. While there were more German firms than Austrian firms relative to the size of each country, the reason why Germany introduced a reform rather than Austria was the latter's tendency to follow developments in Germany with some delay. 92 91 Ringe 2013, pp. 262-263. 92 The Austrian Aktiengesetz has its origins in German law, which is one of the reasons why policymakers and scholars follow developments in Germany closely. See, e.g. Spamann 2009 , p 1825 n. 27. Kalss 2015 . But note that, unlike most other business law, the Law on Private Limited Liability Companies (GmbHG) of 1907 was not replaced by a German equivalent in 1938.
We can also attempt to tackle the issue with statistical analysis and perform a Difference in-Difference (DiD) regression looking only at these two time series. Unlike in the previous figures, Figure 6 shows timelines for the two countries from 2000 to 2016 broken down on a monthly basis. This has the advantage of yielding a much larger number of observations and the possibility of tweaking the "treatment date" of the legal reform in question more accurately. The disadvantage is that control variables one could use on a yearly basis are not available or cannot easily broken down to the monthly level. While the first panel of Figure 6 shows the timelines in terms of the number of firm formations, in the second panel they are transformed to a logarithmic scale. there is a further reduction in Germany that is not paralleled in Austria. Figure 6 uses only one particular definition of "Centros firms", but the same phenomena can be seen when a different definition is used. 93
The logarithmic scale does not show the same development as clearly, but it has the advantage that the two countries exhibit a parallel trend, which allows a difference-in-difference regression to test the impact of the reform. 94 To test the null hypothesis that the law had no effect, we can employ the following regression model:
The results are shown in The main coefficient of interest is the interaction term between Germany and the enactment of the reform ( 1 ). The coefficient indicates that the German reform likely had a modest effect, at least relative to Austria. 1 is negative and statistically significant throughout all regressions. The parallel trend assumption appears to hold because the time trend is not statistically significant (when we include industry output as a control). 96 Angrist & Pischke 2009, p. 238. 97 Newey and West 1987; Millo 2017 . A Breusch-Godfrey test indicated autocorrelation for all regressions.
The regressions would seem to suggest that the reform did in fact have a considerable impact in Germany (relative to Austria) between 59% and 65%. 98 In absolute terms, the reduction is of course much smaller than the decrease in the two years between mid-2006 and 2008. This confirms Ringe's argument that the English private limited company must have lost some of its significance for reasons other than the German reform. 99 The reform seems to have simply resulted in an additional, smaller reduction of new firm formations of this type. While it is not a direct confirmation of Braun et al's results, this result is compatible with their finding of an increase in the formation of domestic German firms. 100
Belgium v. the Netherlands
We can attempt a similar comparison for Belgium and the Netherlands, again using the Panel C timeline looking only at firms using an agent, and looking at the introduction of the SPRL-S in Belgium as the reform to be tested. 101 When we compare the monthly trends between these two countries, the difference appears greater than between Austria and Germany, even if the population sizes of the two countries are more similar. The number of incorporations in the UK by Dutch founders shot up in 2004 -likely the immediate impact of Inspire Art, peaking in 2006.
This trend was not reflected in Belgium, which exhibited a peak only in 2009, after which there is a decline in both countries, which is more pronounced in Belgium than in the Netherlands. 98 For example, −0.966 − 1 = −0.619, which indicates an estimated reduction of 61.9%. 99 Ringe 2013, p 257. 100 rithmic scale. It appears that these two countries had different trends before the introduction of the SPRL-S in 2010, with the numbers in the Netherlands slightly declining, but still increasing in Belgium. Especially on the logarithmic scale, the trend in Belgium turns and subsequently parallels the one in the Netherlands around the time of the introduction of the SPRL-S. Table 2 reports a regression analogous to the one in the previous subsection. The regressions in Table 2 are analogous to the ones performed for Austria and Germany above, but cover the period from 2006 through 2016. The key interaction variable Belgium*post_SPRLS is statistically significant only when we control for the country specific time trend (Belgium*time). The results here are consequently less robust than in the Germany/Austria comparison because they require us to account for differences in the trends between the two countries. Most likely, the company laws and traditional legal form choice patterns of the two countries were too different in the first place to provide for an ideal comparison. If anything, the reform may have helped to bring Belgian incorporation trends, which might otherwise have continued on a more upward trajectory, more in line with those in the Netherlands. In any event, the absolute numbers of firms are quite small and of little economic significance.
Conclusion
This article has explored the market for the incorporation of privately held firms in Europe and the US. Over the past 20 years since Centros, European legislatures have engaged in activity that may be considered "defensive regulatory competition," and may have had more or less legitimate reasons to do so. Overall, it appears that the option of setting up a private limited company in another Member State did not result in a permanent undermining of the regulatory authority over corporate law of any country. Against this backdrop, it is difficult to describe defensive regulatory competition as particularly well justified. Nevertheless, if we accept the goals of defensive regulatory competition, we have seen that at least the German one likely helped to further reduce the number of new private limited company formations in the UK by German founders. However, by the time of the enactment of the reform, the number had already decreased considerably for different reasons. Still, regulatory competition has resulted in legislative changes across the continent, in particular concerning the relationship between firms and their creditors. It has, most likely, accelerated the ongoing demise of the legal capital system.
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